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Abstract
EXPLORING PLATFORM (SEMI)GROUPS FOR
NON-COMMUTATIVE KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS
By: HA T. LAM
Advisor: Delaram Kahrobaei
In this work, my advisor Delaram Kahrobaei, our collaborator David Garber,
and I explore polycyclic groups generated from number fields as platform for
the AAG key-exchange protocol. This is done by implementing four different
variations of the length-based attack, one of the major attacks for AAG, and
submitting polycyclic groups to all four variations with a variety of tests. We
note that this is the first time all four variations of the length-based attack are
compared side by side. We conclude that high Hirsch length polycyclic groups
generated from number fields are suitable for the AAG key-exchange protocol.
This work is also in the paper [11].
Delaram Kahrobaei and I also carry out a similar strategy with the Heisen-
berg groups, testing them as platform for AAG with the length-based attack.
We conclude that the Heisenberg groups, with the right parameters are resistant
against the length-based attack. This work can also be found in [29].
Another work in collaboration with Delaram Kahrobaei and Vladimir Sh-
pilrain is to propose a new platform semigroup for the HKKS key-exchange
protocol, that of matrices over a Galois field. We discuss the security of HKKS
under this platform and advantages in computation cost. Our implementation
of the HKKS key-exchange protocol with matrices over a Galois field yields fast
run time. Our work is presented in [31].
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Preface
Almost eighty years ago, G. H. Hardy, in his famous “A Mathematician’s Apol-
ogy”, wrote about the inapplicability of number theory to “ordinary human ac-
tivities”. He would be surprised by the rise of the field of cryptography, based
on number theoretic problems, in the 1970s. A similar phenomenon is happen-
ing with group theory. From the introduction of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
key-exchange protocol [1] to the work of Ko-Lee et. al. [32], non-commutative
groups like the braid groups are increasingly being used for various crypto-
graphic primitives.
Although relatively new, non-commutative cryptography has become an ac-
tive field of research, attracting both mathematicians and computer scientists.
In the last twenty years, numerous non-commutative cryptographic primitives
have been proposed, and so have attacks against them. Of equal importance is
the study of different platforms for these protocols, as the security of a cryp-
tosystem relies not only on the security of the protocol but also on the under-
lying platform (semi)group. In this work, we explore different platform groups
for the AAG key-exchange protocol using one of its major attacks, the length-
based attack. We also propose a different platform semigroup for the HKKS
key-exchange protocol which yields fast computation.
In Chapter 1, we give some background on public-key cryptography and
vii
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a list of problems commonly used in non-commutative cryptography. We then
describe the AAG key-exchange protocol and analyze its security. Finally, we
describe some criteria for platform groups for AAG in particular, and for other
non-commutative cryptographic primitives in general.
Chapter 2 is about polycyclic groups. We define polycyclic groups and talk
about their presentation. We describe a method of generating polycyclic groups
with number field. At the end, we give reasons why polycyclic groups generated
this way is suitable as platform group.
In Chapter 3, we describe the idea behind the length-based attack, its
history and related work. We then talk about the four variations of the length-
based attack that we implemented in GAP and compare their advantages and
disadvantages.
The previous three chapters build up to Chapter 4, which explores poly-
cyclic groups generated from number fields as platform for the AAG key-exchange
protocol by testing them under the length-based attack. The implementations
details and results of our experiments are detailed here. We conclude that high
Hirsch length polycyclic groups generated this way are suitable for AAG.
Chapter 5 attempts a similar process with the Heisenberg groups. We in-
troduce the Heisenberg groups, put them through the same vigorous testing that
we talked about in the previous chapter and concludes that Heisenberg groups,
with the correct parameters, are resistant against the length-based attack.
Chapter 6 describes the HKKS key-exchange protocol and its inspiration,
the classic Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol. Two platforms for HKKS, the
multiplicative group of integers modulus a prime and matrices over group rings,
are described.
The last chapter, Chapter 7 introduces a new platform semigroup for the
HKKS key-exchange protocol, that of matrices over a Galois field. The security
ix
of the protocol under this platform is discussed. Finally, we talk about our
implementation of the HKKS key-exchange protocol with matrices over a Galois
field and give measurements showing that the protocol under this platform has
fast run time.
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Chapter 1
Non-Commutative
Cryptography and the AAG
Key-Exchange Protocol
1.1 Background on Non-Commutative Cryptog-
raphy
In anticipation of the discussion about the AAG protocol, here we give an
overview of several concepts relating to public-key cryptography and non-commutative
cryptography. For an introduction to public-key commutative cryptography,
we refer to the book by Koblitz [33]; for more detailed discussion on non-
commutative cryptography, see the book by Myasnikov, Shpilrain and Ushakov
[38].
1.1.1 Public-key and symmetric-key cryptography
There are currently two main classes of cryptographic primitives, public-key
(or asymmetric) and symmetric-key. In public-key algorithms, there are two
1
2separate keys, a public key that is published and a private key which is kept
secret. In encryption, for example, the public key is used to encrypt the plaintext
and the private key is used to decrypt the ciphertext. Knowledge of the public
key does not imply knowledge of the private key in any efficient computation.
In fact, the public key is usually generated from the private key using a one-way
trapdoor function, a function that is easy to compute given any input but hard
to invert given the image of a random input, unless some special information,
called the trapdoor, is given. A typical example of public-key encryption that
is used widely in electronic commerce is the RSA cryptosystem whose one-way
trapdoor function is the product of two large primes p, q. Computing their
product is easy, but factoring a large number into its prime factors, at this
time, remains a hard problem.
The other type of cryptographic primitive, symmetric-key has been in used
far longer than public-key, tracing back to Julius Caesar and possibly further.
The main difference between public-key and symmetric-key primitives is that
in symmetric-key ciphers, knowledge of encryption key is usually equivalent to,
or exactly equal to, knowledge of decryption key, hence the name “symmetric”.
This property requires the two parties to agree on a shared secret before com-
municating through an open channel. In the past, this exchange of secret keys
usually relied on human factor and thus prone to information leakage. After
the advent of public-key cryptography in the 1970s, it became much less trou-
blesome to exchange secret key over an insecure channel. The Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange protocol is a good example of how to exchange a shared secret,
we will visit it more in depth in chapter 7.
3As of current date, public-key algorithms are still more computationally
costly than symmetric algorithshms given the same security parameter [42].
Therefore, some modern cryptosystem, OpenPGP for example, employs a hy-
brid system in which a session key is distributed using an asymmetric cipher
prior to symmetric encryption.
1.1.2 Commonly used problems in non-commutative cryp-
tography
All of our discussion of cryptographic primitives thus far has involved only
finite abelian (or commutative) groups. There are several problems used in
commutative cryptography, but the two main ones are factoring and discrete
logarithm. With current technology, these two problems remain hard; however,
there are efficient quantum algorithms to solve both of them. Thus, there is
motivation to expand the search for new cryptographic primitives based on other
branches of mathematics. A currently active branch of research is cryptography
based on non-commutative groups.
The problems used in non-commutative cryptography are based on com-
binatorial group theory; however, our goal here is not to provide a detailed
exposition, we refer instead to the book by Lyndon and Schupp [34].
In general, there are three kinds of problems in group theory: decision,
witness, and search problems.
1. Decision problems: given an object O and a property P , decide whether
or not O has the property P .
42. Witness problems: given an object O with property P , find a proof (or a
“witness”) of the fact that O has property P .
3. Search problems: given a property P and information that there are ob-
jects with property P , find a proof of a particular instance of an object
having property P . Hence, search problems are a special case of witness
problems.
Every decision problem has an accompanied witness problem, and most of
them has a natural search version. This is illustrated in the following list of
problems most commonly used in non-commutative cryptography. In all of
these problems, G is a group with finite presentation 〈X | R〉 where X is the
set of generators and R is the set of relators. The identity element of G is 1.
We use the following notation: yx = x−1yx where x, y ∈ G.
• Word Problem: the word (decision) problem (WP) is: given a group
G and an element g ∈ G, find whether or not g =G 1. The word search
problem (WSP) is: given a g =G 1, find a presentation of g as a product of
conjugates of defining relators and their inverses. The word problem was
first used in a public-key protocol by Wagner and Magyarik in 1985 [49],
arguably the first non-commutative cryptosystem. It was neither secure
nor practical, but nonetheless, pioneering.
• Membership Problem: the subgroup membership (decision) problem is:
given a subgroupH ≤ G and an element g ∈ G, find whether or not g ∈ H.
The membership search problem is: given a subgroup H ≤ G generated
by h1, . . . , hk and an element h ∈ H, find an expression of h in terms of
5h1, . . . , hk. A cryptosystem invented in 2006 by Shpilrain and Zapata [47]
makes use of the subgroup membership search problem directly. Aside
from that, the security of the AAG key-exchange protocol also implicitly
relies on it as detailed in section 1.2.
• Conjugacy Problem: the conjugacy (decision) problem (CP) is: given
g, h ∈ G, find whether or not there is an x ∈ G such that gx = h. The
conjugacy search problem (CSP) is: given g, h ∈ G such that they are
conjugates of each other, find an x ∈ G such that gx = h. There are
other variants of the conjugacy search problem such as the simultaneous
conjugacy search problem (otherwise known as the generalized conjugacy
search problem in [13]): given ui, vi ∈ G, 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that uxi = vi for
some x ∈ G, find x′ ∈ G such that ux′i = vi for all i = 1, . . . , n. The prime
example of the conjugacy search problem being used in a cryptosystem
is the AAG key-exchange protocol, we discuss AAG in details in section
1.2.
1.2 The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld Key Exchange
Protocol
In 1999, Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld introduced a key-exchange protocol [1]
called the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchanged protocol (or Arithmetica, or
commutator key-exchange) that stands out from other protocols because it does
not employ any commuting subgroups of the platform group nor require them to
be commutative. In fact, the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchanged protocol
6(AAG for short) can use any non-abelian group in which the word problem is
efficiently solvable.
1.2.1 Description of AAG
We use as usual two entities, called Alice and Bob, to present the two parties
which plan to communicate over an insecure channel.
The AAG Key-Exchange Protocol
Alice
Alice’s private key:
A = aε1s1 . . . a
εL
sL
asi ∈ a, εi = ±1
Alice’s public set:
a = (a1, . . . , aN1)
Bob’s public set:
b = (b1, . . . , bN2)
b′i=A
−1biA bi∈b i=1,...,N2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
a′i=B
−1aiB ai∈a i=1,...,N1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Bob
Bob’s private key:
B = bδ1t1 . . . b
δL
tL
bti ∈ b, δi = ±1
Let G be a general group with generators g1, . . . , gn. First, Alice chooses, as
her public set, a = (a1, . . . , aN1) where ai ∈ G and Bob chooses, as his public set,
b = (b1, . . . , bN2) where bi ∈ G. They both publish their sets. Alice then chooses
her private key A = aε1s1 . . . a
εL
sL
where asi ∈ a and εi = ±1. Bob also chooses his
private key B = bδ1t1 . . . b
δL
tL
where bti ∈ b and δi = ±1. Alice computes b′i = bAi
for all bi ∈ b and sends b′ = (b′1, . . . , b′N2) to Bob. Bob also computes a′i = aBi
for all ai ∈ a and sends a′ = (a′1, . . . , a′N1) to Alice. Now the shared secret key
7is K = [A,B] = A−1B−1AB. Alice can computes this key by
KA = A
−1a′ε1s1 · · · a′εLsL = A−1(B−1as1B)ε1 · · · (B−1asLB)εL
= A−1B−1aε1s1 · · · aεLsLB = A−1B−1AB = K
Bob can likewise computes KB = B
−1b′δ1t1 · · · b′δLtL = B−1A−1BA, then the shared
key is K = K−1B .
1.2.2 Security analysis of AAG
It may appear at first that solving the simultaneous conjugacy search problem
in G for A in the equations b′i = b
A
i (or symmetrically, for B in the equations
a′i = a
B
i ), is enough to obtain the secret key K. However, this is not the
case, as Shpilrain and Ushakov noted in [46]; the adversary Eve would need to
know A (or B) not just as a word in the generators of G but also as a word
in (a1, . . . , aN1) (respectively (b1, . . . , bN2)), otherwise, for example, she cannot
compute AB from (a′1, . . . , a
′
N1
). Hence, after solving the simultaneous conjugacy
search problem for G, Eve would need to solve the membership search problem:
given A and (a1, . . . , aN1), find an expression of A as a word in (a1, . . . , aN1).
Another consideration is that even if Eve finds an A′ ∈ G such that bAi = bA′i
for all bi, it does not imply that A
′ = A in G. Indeed, there could be a
cb ∈ G such that A′ = cbA and cbbi = bicb, then bA′i = (cbA)−1bi(cbA) =
A−1c−1b bicbA = A
−1c−1b cbbiA = b
A
i . Since this is true for all bi in Bob’s public
set b = (b1, . . . , bN2), it’s true for any element in the subgroup generated by
(b1, . . . , bN2), in particular, it’s true for B, Bob’s private key, i.e., B
A′ = BA.
This can lead to Eve finding the wrong key if she does not perform a check,
8equivalent to solving the membership decision problem. Suppose Eve finds A′
such that A′ = cbA where cbbi = bicb, and B′ such that B′ = caB where
caai = aica. Then ca commutes with A and cb commutes with B. From the
information she has, Eve computes the key
K ′ = (A′)−1(B′)−1A′B′ = (cbA)−1(caB)−1(cbA)(caB)
= A−1c−1b B
−1c−1a cbAcaB = A
−1B−1c−1b c
−1
a cbcaAB (1.1)
This is the same as the key K that Alice and Bob compute if and only if ca
commutes with cb. Eve does not know what K is, but there is a test that
she could do, namely to check if A′ ∈ 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉, or equivalently, if B′ ∈
〈b1, . . . , bN2〉. If one of these conditions is true, say A′ ∈ 〈ai〉, then cb is also in
〈ai〉 since A′ = cbA. We have ca commutes with all the ai, so it follows that ca
commutes with cb. Hence, by equation 1.1, K
′ = A−1B−1AB = K.
These considerations show that if the adversary chooses to break AAG by
directly solving the conjugacy search problem then she will have to either solve
the membership search problem or the membership decision problem next. In
certain group, the membership decision problem is not even solvable, for exam-
ple, in F2 × F2, Mihailova shows that this problem has no solution [36].
In summary, to break AAG, the eavesdropper needs to solve the subgroup-
restricted simultaneous conjugacy search problem: given a subgroup H < G and
ui, vi ∈ G, 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that uxi = vi for some x ∈ H, find x′ ∈ H such that
ux
′
i = vi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Fortunately, there are heuristic attacks on the AAG protocol that avoid this
problem because they are specifically designed to find solution of a system of
9equations from a set of given elements. One of these heuristic attacks, the
length-based attack, is discussed in details in chapter 3.
Furthermore, the conjugacy search problem has been used for several other
cryptographic protocols, such as the non-commutative Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change [32], the non-commutative El-Gamal key exchange [27], the non-abelian
Cramer-Shoup key exchange [2] and the non-commutative digital signatures
[28]. The length-based attack can be applied to all of these protocols, hence
testing different groups against it and collecting data about parameters that
make them resistant to LBA is important, not just for the implementation of
AAG but also of other protocols.
1.3 Platform Groups for Non-Commutative Cryp-
tographic Primitives
There are some requirements for a group G to be used as platform group for the
AAG protocol; however, these requirements are not restricted to AAG but are
useful ground-rules for other non-commutative cryptographic primitives as well.
The paper [45] by Shpilrain first attempted to establish these requirements, they
are later formalized in the book [38].
(P 0) The group G should be finitely presented. This allows encoding of the
group in a computer system.
(P 1) The word problem in G can be solved effectively. This requirement is
needed for fast computation of the common key. Since the presence of a
10
normal form for G implies that the word problem is solvable, and normal
form is also useful for another purpose (see next item), a group G with
normal form is usually preferable.
(P 2) Elements in G after conjugation should be sufficiently disguised, i.e. it
should be impossible to recover x from x−1ux just by inspection. This is
usually achieved by requiring that G has normal form. The normal form
of the element x−1ux typically has different presentation from the element
itself, making recovering x hard. If G lacks a normal form, it should have
at least one short relator to allow for cancellation in x−1ux.
(P 3) The search conjugacy problem has no efficient solution in G. This is a hard
requirement to prove, so in practice, we only expect the search conjugacy
problem in G to be well-studied.
(P 4) The group G should have exponential or intermediate (subexponential
but not polynomial) growth. Informally, the growth function in a group
determines the number of elements of length n in the group. Requiring G
to have fast growth function makes the key space large, which discourages
brute force attack.
There are other considerations besides these core requirements, such as the
ease of implementation of G, how well-studied G is to avoid attacks from differ-
ent areas of study and how well-known G is for marketability. The paper [45],
in particular, has an interesting discussion about marketability versus security,
with the prime example of braid groups.
Chapter 2
Polycyclic Groups
2.1 Polycyclic Groups
The study of polycyclic groups started with Hirsch’s series of papers [20, 19,
21, 22, 23], and has since been continued by R. Baer, A.I. Mal’cev, P. Hall and
most recently, in the seminal book by Segal [43]. Polycyclic groups, despite
their simple concept, have deep algebraic structure which make them attrac-
tive for applications. However, polycyclic groups have not been considered in
conjunction with cryptography until the paper by Eick and Kahrobaei [7]. In
this chapter, we review the basic properties of polycyclic groups, we investigate
a method of generating them from number fields and finally, we consider their
suitability as platform group for the AAG key-exchange protocol.
2.1.1 Polycyclic groups: definitions and examples
The concept of polycyclic groups arises from finite extensions of cyclic groups,
one of the most fundamental of all group structures, but the resulting structure
is much more complex. Here, we give a brief review of some of the definitions
11
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and results involving polycyclic groups. We refer to [25, 9, 43] for more details.
Definition 2.1.1. G is a polycyclic group if it has a subnormal series with
non-trivial cyclic factors, i.e.,
G = G1 D G2 D . . . D Gn+1 = 1
where Gi/Gi+1 is cyclic for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The subnormal series for G is also called a polycyclic series, but it is not
unique for the group G, as we will see in example 2.1.1.
For each polycyclic series, since Gi/Gi+1 is cyclic, there exists a gi ∈ G for
each factor group such that Gi = 〈gi, Gi+1〉. On the other hand, consider a
sequence X = (g1, . . . , gn), xi ∈ G. We can define subgroups Gi = 〈gi, . . . , gn
for 1 ≤ 1 ≤ n, so X defines the subgroup series G1 ≥ . . . ≥ Gn ≥ Gn+1 = 1 of
G. We come to the following definition:
Definition 2.1.2. A sequence X = (g1, . . . , gn), xi ∈ G is a polycyclic (generat-
ing) sequence for G if the subgroup series determined by X forms a polycyclic
series for G.
It is clear that a group is polycyclic if and only if it has a polycyclic se-
quence. We note, however, that each polycyclic series can have several different
polycyclic sequences as we will see in example 2.1.1.
Fix a polycyclic sequence X for G, if we let the orders of the the factors
groups be ri = [Gi : Gi+1], 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have the following definitions:
Definition 2.1.3. R(X) = (r1, . . . , rn) is the sequence of relative orders, and
I(X) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | ri is finite} is the finite index set for the polycyclic
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sequence in consideration.
Example 2.1.1. [25] Consider the dihedral group of order 8, D8 ∼= 〈(1, 2, 3, 4), (1, 3)〉.
It has polycyclic series:
1. D8 ∼= G1 D G2 D G3 = 1 where G2 ∼= C4, the cyclic group of order 4.
This series has several different polycyclic sequences, two of which are:
(a) Polycyclic sequence X = ((1 3), (1 2 3 4)) with relative orders R(X) =
(2, 4) and finite index set I(X) = {1, 2}, and
(b) Polycyclic sequence Y = ((2 4), (1 4 3 2)) with relative orders R(Y ) =
R(X) = (2, 4), and finite index set I(Y ) = I(X) = {1, 2}.
2. Another polycyclic series is D8 = G1 D G2 D G3 D G4 = 1 where
G2 ∼= V4, the Klein four-group, and G3 ∼= C2. This series also has, for
example, two different polycyclic sequences:
(a) Polycyclic sequence X = ((2 4), (1 2)(3 4), (1 3)(2 4)) with relative or-
ders R(X) = (2, 2, 2) and finite index set I(X) = {1, 2, 3}, and
(b) Polycyclic sequence Y = ((1 2 3 4), (1 2)(3 4), (1 3)(2 4)) with relative
orders R(Y ) = R(X) = (2, 2, 2), and finite index set I(Y ) = I(X) =
{1, 2, 3}.
For the finite polycyclic groups, the order of the group is the product of
relative orders. In the previous example, |D8| = 2 · 4 = 2 · 2 · 2 = 8 is the
product of relative orders for all cases. Otherwise, G is an infinite polycyclic
groups if and only if at least one of the relative orders is infinite; in that case,
|I(X)| < n.
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As we can see, both the relative orders R(X) and the finite index set I(X) is
invariant of the polycyclic sequence, but dependent on the polycyclic series. On
the other hand, a very useful notion relating to polycyclic groups is the Hirsch
length:
Definition 2.1.4. The Hirsch length of a polycyclic group G, h(G), is the
number of infinite entries in the relative orders.
We can easily see that h(G) is invariant regarding the polycyclic series chosen
because, given any two polycyclic series, we can use the Schreier refinement
theorem to make sure that they have equivalent refinements.
Example 2.1.2. [9] An example of an infinite polycyclic group is the infinite
dihedral group G generated by
a =
−1 0
0 1
 and b =
1 1
0 1
 .
G has polycyclic series representing by the following sequences:
1. X = (a, b) with relative orders (2,∞) and finite index set I = {1}, and
2. Other polycyclic sequences are X = (a, b, bm) for m ∈ N with relative
orders (2,m,∞) and finite index set I = {1, 2}.
Here, the Hirsch length, h(G), is 1, regardless of which polycyclic series is used,
whereas the finite entries in the relative orders are almost arbitrary.
Another useful feature of polycyclic sequences is that we can write any ele-
ment in G uniquely in terms of the elements of a polycyclic sequence, i.e., given
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g ∈ G and a polycyclic sequence X = (g1, . . . , gn) of G with relative orders
(r1, . . . , rn) and finite index set I, we can uniquely write g as g = g
e1
1 · · · genn
where e1, . . . , en ∈ Z and 0 ≤ ei < ri for i ∈ I.
Definition 2.1.5. The normal form of an element g ∈ G is the unique ex-
pression g = ge11 · · · genn above and the corresponding vector (e1, . . . , en) is the
exponent vector of g.
We say a group G has normal form if every element of G has normal form.
Hence, polycyclic groups has normal form. Furthermore, there are algorithms,
such as the collection algorithm, that allow normal form of an element of a
polycyclic group to be determined effectively for most common representations
[9]. This makes the word problem solvable efficiently in polycyclic groups.
2.1.2 Polycyclic presentation
There are some well-known presentations for polycyclic groups: polycyclic pre-
sentation and matrix presentation. Out of the two, polycyclic presentation
allows us to easily see a polycyclic sequence and, if the presentation is consis-
tent, let us derive its sequence of relative orders. We refer to the book by D.
Holt [25] and B. Eick’s habilitation [9] for more details.
Definition 2.1.6. A polycyclic presentation is a finite presentation with gen-
erators g1, . . . , gn and a sequence S = (s1, . . . , sn) that satisfies:
gsii = wi(gi+1, . . . , gn) where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and si <∞,
g
gj
i = uij(gi+1, . . . , gn) where 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n and,
g
g−1j
i = vij(gi+1, . . . , gn) where 1 ≤ j < i ≤ n.
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The first type of relations are called power relations, the second and third
types are called conjugate relations. The sequence S = (s1, . . . , sn) is called the
sequence of power exponents. Note that other relations of the form g
gj
i = gi
are called trivial polycyclic relations and are usually omitted from a polycyclic
presentation.
By investigating normal forms of powers and conjugates of elements in a
polycyclic sequence, we can see that they follow the format of polycyclic rela-
tions. The following result is easy to see:
Theorem 2.1.3. [25] Every polycyclic sequence determines a unique polycyclic
presentation. Thus, every polycyclic group can be defined by a polycyclic pre-
sentation.
We note that the sequence of power exponents is not exactly the same as the
relative orders, however, they are related to each other in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1.4. [25] Let 〈g1, . . . , gn | R〉 be a polycyclic presentation of a
group G with power exponents S = (s1, . . . , sn). Then G is polycyclic and
X = (g1, . . . , gn) is a polycyclic sequence for G with relative orders R(X) =
(r1, . . . , rn) satisfying ri ≤ si for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Among other things, this allows an “almost normal form” for elements of
the group G, giving rise to the following concept:
Definition 2.1.7. Let G be a polycyclic group defined by a polycyclic presenta-
tion with generators g1, . . . , gn and power exponents S = (s1, . . . , sn), then every
element g ∈ G can be represented by a collected word of the form g = ge11 · · · genn
where e1, . . . , en ∈ Z and 0 ≤ ei < si if si <∞.
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Because the exponents of a collected word is bounded by the power expo-
nents, not the relative orders, we do not have the (unique) normal form of the
element. However, the normal form of g is a collected word.
The collection algorithm can be used to find a collected word of an element.
Suppose G is a group with a polycyclic presentation and element g ∈ G is
given as a word w in the generators. The collection algorithm essentially goes
through subwords of w and modify them using the relations in the polycyclic
presentation of G until the end result is a collected word. It can be shown that
the algorithm terminates. For more information on the collection algorithm, see
[25, 9].
So far, we have looked at the general case where the power exponents and
the relative orders are different. It is useful to consider the case where they are
the same because this is the presentation that is most used in algorithms for
polycyclic groups. We arrive at the following definition:
Definition 2.1.8. A polycyclic presentation where the power exponents and
the relative orders are the same is called consistent (or confluent).
With a similar proof to the one of theorem 2.1.3, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 2.1.5. [25] Every polycyclic sequence determines a consistent poly-
cyclic presentation. Thus, every polycyclic group can be defined by a consistent
polycyclic presentation.
As an example of the usefulness of a consistent polycyclic presentation, we
note that with a consistent polycyclic presentation, the collection algorithm
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produces normal forms of elements instead of just collected words. Thus, the
word problem can be solved.
2.1.3 Generating polycyclic groups with number field
There are many types of polycyclic groups and many ways of generating them.
In this section, we talk about a particular method, generating polycyclic groups
with number field. The main idea here is to construct polycyclic groups as
semidirect products of the maximal order and the unit group of a number field.
We use this method because it gives us polycyclic group of high Hirsch length
that has exponential growth. This construction follows [25].
First, we give a brief reminder of number fields and some concepts relating
to it. For more details, see [48].
Definition 2.1.9. F is an (algebraic) number field if it is a finite field extension
of Q.
There are several ways of generating number field, for our purpose, we con-
sider an irreducible polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x], then f defines a field extension F
over Q.
Definition 2.1.10. The maximal order or the ring of integers OF of the
number field F is the set of algebraic integers in F , i.e., OF = {a ∈ F |
there exists a monic polynomial fa(x) ∈ Z[x] such that fa(a) = 0}. The unit
group of F is UF = {a ∈ OF | a 6= 0 and a−1 ∈ OF}.
To generate polycyclic group from the maximal order and unit group of a
number field F where [F : Q] = n, we recall two results.
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Theorem 2.1.6. [48] The maximal order OF forms a ring whose additive group
is isomorphic to Zn.
The proof of this theorem involves finding an integral basis for F as a vector
space over Q, which is also a basis for OF . We do this by choosing a Q-basis of
F of minimal discriminant. For more details of the proof, see [48].
The second theorem is due to Dirichlet:
Theorem 2.1.7. [48] (Dirichlet) Let n = s+2t where s and 2t are the numbers
of real and complex field monomorphisms F → C, then the unit group UF is a
finitely generated abelian group of the form UF ∼= Cs+t−1∞ × Cm where m ∈ 2N
and C∞ ∼= Z and Cm is the cyclic group of order m.
Here, we mainly make use of the fact that the unit group is a finitely gener-
ated abelian group, and hence also polycyclic.
Let G be a group and N E G, it is easy to see that if N and G/N are both
polycyclic then the group G is also polycyclic. We show this by putting together
the polycyclic series of N and the series induced from the polycyclic series of
G/N . Since the above results guarantee that the maximal order is a polycyclic
group and the unit group, which is isomorphic to G/OF , is also polycyclic, the
group G = OF o UF is polycyclic. The action here is multiplication from the
right of UF on OF .
Since the Hirsch length of a polycyclic group G is h(G) = h(N) + h(G/N)
if N E G; in our case, h(G) = h(OF) + h(UF) where h(OF) is n, the degree
of the generating polynomial f . Hence, to achieve a polycyclic group of high
Hirsch length, all we need to do is find an irreducible polynomial of high enough
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order and the polycyclic group generated by the above method will have Hirsch
length bigger than the degree of the polynomial.
2.2 Polycyclic groups as platform group
Even though polycyclic groups have been studied since the 1930s and is an active
area of research, it was not until 2004 that Eick and Kahrobaei suggested to use
them in cryptography [7], in particular, as a platform for the AAG key-exchange
protocol. In chapter 1, we listed the requirements for a group to be used as
platform group for non-commutative cryptographic primitives, in particular,
the AAG key-exchange protocol. In this section, we consider polycyclic groups
in relation to these requirements.
(PC 0) Polycyclic groups are finitely presented. The presentation can be easily
coded into a computer system, for example, the polycyclic package by
Eick and Nickel [8] for the GAP system [15], or the MAGMA system [5].
(PC 1) The word problem can be solved effectively in polycyclic groups with con-
sistent polycyclic presentations via the collection algorithm [9, 7].
(PC 2) A result of Eick [9] shows that polycyclic groups with consistent polycyclic
presentations have normal form; in fact, the collection algorithm can be
used to produce normal form of any element, making the word problem
trivial.
(PC 3) The search conjugacy problem in certain polycyclic groups have been stud-
ied by Eick and Kahrobaei and found to be inefficient [7]. We talk more
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about their result at the end of this list.
(PC 4) Polycyclic groups which are not virtually nilpotent have exponential growth
rate (Wolf [50] and Milnor [37]). As mentioned above, polycyclic groups
generated with number fields have this property.
As mentioned above, to study the search conjugacy problem in polycyclic
groups, Eick and Kahrobaei [7] conducted the following experiment: let K =
Q[x]/(fw) be an algebraic number field for a cyclotomic polynomial fw, where
w is a primitive r-th root of unity, and let G(w) = O o U where O is the
maximal order and U the unit group of K, r the order of w and h(G(w)) the
Hirsch length. The average time used for 100 applications of the collection
algorithm on random words and the average time used for 100 applications of
the conjugacy algorithm on random conjugates are:
r h(G(w)) coll conj
3 2 0.00 sec 9.96 sec
4 2 0.00 sec 9.37 sec
7 6 0.01 sec 10.16 sec
11 14 0.05 sec > 100 hrs
We can see that the collection algorithm works very fast even for polycyclic
groups of high Hirsch length, which enables the word problem to be solved
efficiently; but the solution to conjugacy problem is not efficient for groups of
Hirsch length 14 or more. This study gives hint that the conjugacy search
problem for polycyclic groups cannot be solved efficiently.
Together with the other considerations (CP 0-4), polycyclic groups look
like a good candidate for a platform group of the AAG key-exchange protocol
in particular, and a platform group for other non-commutative cryptographic
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primitive in general. Taking this as an inspiration, we investigate the usefulness
of polycyclic groups as platform for AAG, particularly under the length-based
attack, one of the major attacks against AAG.
Chapter 3
The Length-Based Attack
3.1 History and Related Work
The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol has been studied under var-
ious attacks, of which the length-based attack is one of the major methods. The
length-based attack originated in 2002 with the paper by Hughes and Tannen-
baum [26]. In this paper, they gave an example of the method applied to the
braid group. They also noted that the method is based on the assumption that
elements in the group used in the AAG protocol has a canonical presentation
whose length can be computed rapidly. However, there were doubts regarding
the method [14] because no realization of the idea was given; in particular, no
definition of an effective length function was given, making the success proba-
bility of the approach hard to calculate.
A few years after that, Garber, Kaplan, Teicher, Tsaban and Vishne set out
to settle this problem. In an earlier paper [12], they developed a technique which
extended the standard length-based attack by using memory with the intention
of giving probabilistic solutions to equations in braid group. In particular,
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given a system of equations in a finitely generated subgroup of the braid group,
they were able to find a solution to the system with high probability. This
system of equations is exactly the situation that we have with AAG, so it’s not
surprising that a year after that, they expanded this idea into another paper [13],
in which they introduced several effective realizations of the approach. They
defined a new length function on the braid group, and compared it with the
Garside normal form. Finally, they gave experimental results suggesting that
it is infeasible to use this method to solve the Generalized Conjugacy Search
Problem with parameters as in existing protocols.
More recently, Myasnikov and Ushakov developed another variation of the
length-based attack for braid group [39]. They suggested a heuristic algorithm
for the approximation of geodesic length of braids which they used as length
function. They also analyzed the reasons behind failure in some of the im-
plementations of this variation, such as the commutator-type peak, which are
elements whose length after conjugations are shorter than length before conju-
gations. With this analysis, they designed an implementation which is capable
of breaking AAG with high rate of success.
Expanding on this work, Myasnikov, Shpilrain and Ushakov proved that the
same results of the feasibility of length-based attack could be observed in much
larger classes of groups [38]. In particular, it would work for free groups, pure
braid groups, locally commutative non-abelian groups, etc.
Of a different flavor, Shpilrain and Ushakov suggested Thompson’s groups
for a cryptosystem based on the decomposition problem [44]. The length-based
attack has also been deployed against this system in a paper by Ruinskiy, Shamir
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and Tsaban [41].
3.2 Description of the Length-Based Attack
The length-based attack is a probabilistic attack against the AAG, with the
goal of finding Alice’s (or Bob’s) private key. It is based on the idea that
a conjugation of the right element will decrease the length of the captured
package.
Recall that Eve, the eaves-dropper, observing the communications between
Alice and Bob, will see a = (a1, . . . , aN1) which is Alice’s public set, b =
(b1, . . . , bN2) which is Bob’s public set, b
′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
N2
) such that b′i = b
A
i
for i = 1, . . . , N2 which is Alice’s private key in disguise, and a′ = (a′1, . . . , a
′
N1
)
such that a′i = a
B
i for i = 1, . . . , N1 which is Bob’s private key in disguise.
For the purpose of the length-based attack, suppose that Eve wants to guess
A′ ∈ 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 such that b′i = bA′i or symmetrically, B′ ∈ 〈b1, . . . , bN2〉 such
that a′i = a
B′
i , then she can compute the shared key B
−1A−1BA.
For a bit of notation, if c = (c1, . . . , ck), then define its total length |c| to be∑k
i=1 |ci|.
For the purpose of breaking AAG, suppose we want to find the conjugate A′.
We capture the package b′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
N2
) where b′i = A
−1biA. If we conjugate b′
with elements from the group 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 and the resulting tuple has decreased
total length, then we know we have found a conjugating factor, i.e., a factor of
the conjugate A′. The process of conjugation is then repeated with the decreased
length tuple until another conjugating factor is found. The process ends when
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the conjugated captured package is the same as b = (b1, . . . , bN2), which is public
knowledge. Then the conjugate A′ can be recovered by taking a product of the
sequence of conjugating factors in reverse. The entire process can be visualized
as going up the following tower from the bottom
bi
↓
a−ε1s1 bia
ε1
s1
↓
a−ε2s2 a
−ε1
s1
bia
ε1
s1
aε2s2
↓
...
↓
a−εLsL . . . a
−ε2
s2
a−ε1s1 bia
ε1
s1
aε2s2 . . . a
εL
sL
3.3 Variations of the Length-Based Attack
In [13, 12, 39, 41], several variations of LBA are given. Here we give four variants
of LBA that we implemented for AAG based on polycyclic group. In all these
algorithms, the following input and output are expected:
• Input: a = (a1, . . . , aN1), b = (b1, . . . , bN2) and b′ = (b′1, . . . , b′N2) such
that b′i = b
A
i for i = 1, . . . , N2.
• Output: An element A′ ∈ 〈a1, . . . , aN1〉 such that b′i = bA′i for i =
1, . . . , N2 or FAIL if the algorithm cannot find such A
′.
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3.3.1 LBA with backtracking
The most straight-forward variation of the length-based attack, Algorithm 1
conjugates b′ directly with a±1i ∈ {a1, . . . , aN1}. This is termed “LBA with
backtracking” by Myasnikov and Ushakov [39]. First, we initialize the set of
current conjugated tuples, S, with (b′, idG). The first coordinate of the pair
acts as the current tuple to be conjugated, the second coordinate keeps track
of what element has been used to in the conjugation. In each round, we take
out an element of S whose first coordinate has the smallest total length, and
conjugate it with all the candidates a±1i ∈ {a1, . . . , aN1}. For each of the newly
conjugated tuple, we check if the total length of after conjugation is smaller
than the length of the tuple before conjugation. If it is, then that candidate aεii
is a conjugating factor, i.e., a factor of A′. We update the second coordinate of
that tuple to reflect the new factor by multiplying the current factors so far with
the new candidate. We then add the this conjugated tuple back into the set of
current conjugated tuples, S. We continue this until the conjugated tuple that
we get back is equal to b. Then we stop and reverse the sequence of conjugation
factors for the conjugate A′. If we take out every tuple of S, i.e., S = ∅, and
conjugate each of them with all potential candidates but still do not reach the
original b, then we stop and return FAIL.
We note that this algorithm fails in cases where the total length of a con-
jugated tuple is actually shorter than its length before conjugation, i.e., there
exists a peak. In that case, the tuple is never added back into S, hence branches
of possibilities are never investigated.
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Algorithm 1 LBA with backtracking
1: Initialize S = {(b′, idG)}.
2: while S 6= ∅ do
3: Choose (c, x) ∈ S such that |c| is minimal. Remove (c, x)
4: for i = 1, . . . , N1 and ε = ±1 do
5: Compute δi,ε = |c| − |caεi |
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop
7: if δi,ε > 0 {length has been decreased} then
8: Add (ca
ε
i , xaεi ) to S
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL {no more element to conjugate}
3.3.2 LBA with a dynamic set
Through analysis, Myasnikov and Ushakov concluded that the different types
of peaks make LBA unsuccessful [39]. To overcome this, they suggested a new
version of the algorithm, which they termed “LBA with dynamic set”. Here,
depending on whether a candidate causes length reduction, either only the con-
jugates and products involving the candidate are added to the dynamic set,
or, in the unlucky case of no length reduction, all conjugates and two genera-
tors products are added. Their experimental results suggest that this algorithm
works especially well in the case of keys constructed from long generators, but
no less successful than the naive algorithm in other cases. Algorithm 2 is a mod-
ified version of their algorithm, which we implemented to attack AAG based on
polycyclic group.
This is similar to Algorithm 1, but we use a±1i ∈ {a1, . . . , aN1} as candidates
only in the first round. After the first round, the length of the conjugated
tuple might decrease or not. If it does, say by candidate aεmm , we focus on this
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element by adding all the conjugates and two-generator products involving it
to the candidates set, i.e., aext = a ∪ {ajaεmm a−1j , aεmm aj, ajaεmm , (aεmm )2 | aj ∈
a±1,m 6= j} where am is such that the total length of the tuple conjugated by
it decreased the most after the first round, δm = max{δi,ε | i = 1, . . . , N1}.
If, after the first round, none of the conjugated tuple has decreased length, we
extend the candidates set by adding all conjugates and all two-generators prod-
ucts, aext = a ∪ {aiaja−1i , aiaj, a2i | ai, aj ∈ a±1, i 6= j}. It is this last measure
that helps against cases where all conjugated tuples have total length shorter
than their length before conjugations, and it is the reason why Algorithm 2 is
more successful than Algorithm 1. Even then, this is not an exhaustive search
because we are only considering conjugates and two-generator products, so the
algorithm may still fail. However, there is a trade off between the depth-first
idea of adding candidates of more complex structure (say, four-generator prod-
ucts) to test against, which increase computation time, and the breadth-first
idea of moving on to the next tuple and hope for a lucky hit.
3.3.3 LBA with memory 1
Based on [12], we came up with another version of LBA that is based on a fixed-
size memory M allocated to the algorithm. Here, S holds M tuples every round
and is sorted by the first coordinate (length of conjugated element) of each tuple.
In every round, the smallest element of S is removed and conjugated by all the
generators and their inverses. Then the conjugated tuples are added back into
S depending on whether there is still a free place in S, i.e., whether |S| ≤ M ,
as opposed to whether their length has been reduced like in Algorithm 1 and 2.
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Algorithm 2 LBA with dynamic set
1: Initialize S = {(b′, idG)}.
2: while S 6= ∅ do
3: Choose (c, x) ∈ S such that |c| is minimal. Remove (c, x)
4: for i = 1, . . . , N1 and ε = ±1 do
5: Compute δi,ε = |c| − |caεi |
6: end for
7: if δi,ε ≤ 0 for all i then
8: Define aext = a ∪ {xixjx−1i , xixj, x2i | xi, xj ∈ a±1, i 6= j}
9: else
10: Define aext = a ∪ {xjxmx−1j , xmxj, xjxm, x2m | xj ∈ a±1,m 6= j} where
xm s.t. δm = max{δi,ε | i = 1, . . . , N1}
11: end if
12: for all w ∈ aext do
13: Compute δw = |c| − |cw|
14: end for
15: if cw = b then output inverse of xw and stop
16: if δw > 0 {length has been decreased} then
17: Add (cw, xw) to S
18: end if
19: end while
20: Otherwise, output FAIL {no more element to conjugate}
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If there is no more places in S, and if the conjugated tuple has total length
smaller than the length of the largest element in S, then swap them instead,
and then re-sort S. Note that since S is kept sorted always, any operation
to find “smallest element” is in constant time. Because S is never empty as
in Algorithm 1 and 2, we use a time-out that can be changed as the stopping
condition.
The problem with this approach is that the same conjugated tuple might
be removed and conjugated repeatedly if conjugation does not change its total
length. Because its length stay the same, it gets added back to the beginning
of the S queue, from then it is taken out and re-added ad infinitum.
Algorithm 3 LBA with Memory 1
1: Initialize S = {(|b′|, b′, idG)}.
2: while not time out do
3: Choose (|c|, c, x) ∈ S such that |c| is minimal. Remove (|c|, c, x)
4: for i = 1, . . . , N1 and ε = ±1 do
5: Compute ca
ε
i
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop
7: if Size(S) < M then
8: Add (|caεi |, caεi , xaεi ) to S and sort S by first element of every tuple
9: else
10: if |caεi | smaller than first element of all tuples in S then swap them
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
14: Otherwise, output FAIL {no more element to conjugate}
3.3.4 LBA with memory 2
A different algorithm, truer to the spirit of [12], is implemented here. In this
algorithm, S holds M tuples every round similar to Algorithm 3. The difference
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is that in every round, all elements of S are conjugated, but only the M smallest
conjugated tuples (by total length) are added back into S. Because we are
adding back M smallest tuples and not just one single element, we avoid the
pitfall of Algorithm 3. Moreover, this method of saving several tuples, not just
the ones whose length decreased after conjugation, keeps us away from problems
generated by peaks as in Algorithm 1. Here, for the stopping condition, we use
a time-out that is defined by the user as with the previous variant.
Algorithm 4 LBA with Memory 2
1: Initialize S = {(|b′|, b′, idG)}.
2: while not time out do
3: for (|c|, c, x) ∈ S do
4: Remove (|c|, c, x) from S
5: Compute ca
ε
i for all i ∈ {1 . . . N1} and ε = ±1
6: if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of xaεi and stop
7: Save (|caεi |, caεi , xaεi ) in S ′
8: end for
9: After finished all conjugations, sort S ′ by the first element of every tuple
10: Copy the smallest M elements into S and delete the rest of S ′
11: end while
12: Otherwise, output FAIL
Chapter 4
Exploring Polycyclic Groups as
Platform for the AAG
Key-Exchange Protocol
In chapter 1, we introduced the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key-exchange protocol
and talked about platform groups for non-commutative cryptographic primi-
tives. In chapter 2, we talked about polycyclic groups and why they are a good
choice for platform group, in particularly for the AAG protocol. We recall that
one of the criteria for being a platform group is that the search conjugacy prob-
lem has no efficient solution in the group and we pointed out that this is a hard
requirement to prove.
It is natural then, that in order to study the suitability of polycyclic groups
as platform group, particularly for the AAG protocol, that we deploy one of
the best known attacks against AAG, the length-based attack (LBA), which
we talked about in-depth in chapter 3. To that end, we implemented the four
variants of LBA presented in chapter 3, section 3.3 and ran experiments on
polycyclic groups generated with number fields with different Hirsch lengths.
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4.1 Length Function
Choosing a good length function is an important step in the execution of the
length-based attack. The original Hughes and Tannenbaum paper on length-
based attack [26] was criticized [14] precisely because there was no definition of
an effective length function for the braid group, which was the platform group
suggested. Other researchers have also written about the importance of the
choice of the length function [12, 24, 39].
Since the length-based attack is primarily based on the idea that a conjuga-
tion of the right element will decrease the length of the captured package, it is
important that in general, the length of an element after conjugation is larger
than its length before conjugation; in other words, for a, b ∈ G,
`(a−1ba) `(b) (4.1)
In our case, the length of a word is chosen to be the sum of the absolute values
of the exponents in its normal form, i.e., if g ∈ G has normal form g = ge11 · · · genn ,
then |g| = ∑ni=1 |ei|. We choose this function because experimental results below
show that it satisfies the requirement 4.1.
The experiments are done by first constructing a polycyclic group G of
Hirsch length h(G) following the construction in chapter 2, section 2.1.3. Then
an element b of length between 10 and 13 is randomly chosen; we choose elements
of this length for consistency in the length-based attack parameters. Another
random element a of the same length interval is chosen and ba is computed, and
finally, we compute |ba| − |b|. We ran 100 tests for each group and the average
difference is recorded.
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polynomial h(G) average difference
x2 − x− 1 3 79.92
x5 − x3 − 1 7 80.17
x11 − x3 − 1 16 44.93
As we can see, the average difference is large, in particular, |ba| − |b| is
significantly larger than |a|, indicating that the condition `(a−1ba)  `(b) is
satisfied.
4.2 Implementation Details
As mentioned above, we want to implement the AAG key-exchange protocol,
and simulate attacks on it using the length-based attack. We decide to choose
polycyclic groups generated by number fields for this purpose. Below are the
details of the implementation.
Each polycyclic group is generated by choosing a polynomial f which is
irreducible over Z, then f defines a number field F over Q. Let OF be its
maximal order and UF its unit group, then OF o UF is the desired polycyclic
group. This construction is a part of the Polycyclic Package of GAP [8].
A random element ai, for Alice’s public set, or bi, for Bob’s public set, is
generated by taking either some random generators of the group or their inverses
and multiplying them together, while maintaining that the length of the element
is between a predefined minimum and maximum. The advantage of this method
is having more control over the length of the element.
Alice’s private key A is generated by taking a fixed number of random ele-
ments in a = (a1, . . . , aN1) and multiplying them together, similarly with Bob’s
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private key. Here we forgo control over absolute length of private keys to pre-
serve interesting cases of conjugations actually decreasing the length of bi, i.e.
a commutator-type peak. This way of choosing private keys also better reflects
the nature of the underlying group because there might be cancellations during
multiplications of the elements making up the key, and so the key length might
turn out to be small. This method is similar to what has been used in [39].
4.3 Results
We conducted several sets of tests, all of which were performed on an Intel Core
i7 quad-core 2.0GHz computer with 12GB of RAM, running Ubuntu version
12.04 with GAP version 4.5 under 10GB of memory allowance. In all these
tests, the polycyclic group G with Hirsch length h(G) is constructed by the
above method with polynomial f . The size of Alice’s and Bob’s public sets are
both N1 = N2 = 20.
4.3.1 Effect of Hirsch length
In the first set of tests, every random element ai or bi has length in [L1, L2] =
[10, 13] and Alice’s private key is the product of L = 5 random elements in
Alice’s public set. The time for each batch of 100 tests are recorded together
with its success rate. In each case, a time-out of 60 minutes is enforced for each
test. The following results are obtained by algorithm 2.
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polynomial h(G) time success
x2 − x− 1 3 0.20 hours 100%
x5 − x3 − 1 7 76.87 hours 35%
x7 − x3 − 1 10 94.43 hours 8%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 95.18 hours 5%
x11 − x3 − 1 16 95.05 hours 5%
From this set of results, we can see that with low Hirsch length, the length-
based attack breaks AAG easily with high success rate. However, as Hirsch
length is increased to 7, success rate decreases. The tipping point is Hirsch
length 10, when success rate is only 8% and the time taken is significant. At
higher Hirsch length, we can see the effect of the time-out more prominently
as the total time did not increase much more, but the success rate dropped to
only 5%. Although a succuss rate of 5% is not negligible, note that for this set
of test, we purposely chose a very small value for the key length L. Below, we
will see more experiments where the key length is increased.
The important point here is that in order for LBA to have low success rate,
we only need to choose group of modest Hirsch length, say 14. This helps
in minimizing the amount of memory taken to encode group elements, which
makes transmission of elements between the two parties less expensive.
4.3.2 Effect of key length
In the second set of tests, we vary the number of elements L that compose Alice’s
private key. Myasnikov and Ushakov [39] suggested that LBA with dynamic set
(algorithm 2) has high success rate with long generators, i.e. random elements
have longer length [L1, L2]. Therefore, we also vary the length of random ele-
ments according to parameters in [39]. The following results are obtained by
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Algorithm 2, also with a time-out of 30 minutes.
polynomial h(G) [10,13] [20,23] [40,43]
L = 10 L = 10 L = 20 L = 50
x7 − x3 − 1 10 2% 0% 0% 0%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 0% 0% 0% 0%
x11 − 3x3 − 1 17 0% 0% 0% 0%
The result of this set of tests indicates that just by increasing the number of
generators of Alice’s private key from 5 (as in the previous set of tests) to 10,
LBA already fails with polycyclic group of Hirsch length as low as 10. Hence,
for polycyclic groups to be useful as platform group for AAG, key length needs
not be large.
4.3.3 Comparing the four variants of LBA
A novelty of our approach is the comparison of the four variants of the LBA
for the first time on any platform group. We implement all the four variants to
verify that none of them can break AAG with polycyclic groups as platform.
For comparing the success rate of the four variants of LBA presented in
chapter 3, section 3.3, we purposely choose the test parameters very small in
this set of of tests. They are as follows: N1 = N2 = 20, [L1, L2] = [5, 8], L = 5,
there is a time-out of 30 minutes and memory of M = 500. The polynomial
used is f = x3 − x− 1, generating polycyclic group of Hirsch length only 4.
Algorithm Time Success
Algorithm 1 (LBA with backtracking) 0.57 hours 58%
Algorithm 2 (LBA with dynamic set) 37.35 hours 95%
Algorithm 3 (Memory 1) 32.00 hours 36%
Algorithm 4 (Memory 2) 4.01 hours 92%
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Algorithm 2 gives the best success rate but took much longer than algo-
rithm 4 which gives a comparable success rate with much shorter time. We
conclude that with a sufficient memory size, algorithm 4 is the best variant of
LBA.
4.3.4 Exploring the four variants of LBA on commonly
used test parameters
In the fourth set of tests, we want to see the effect of the four different variants
of LBA applied to test parameters commonly used in other work [13, 39]. There-
fore, we keep the same following parameters for all the algorithms: each random
element has length in [L1, L2] = [10, 13], Alice’s private key is the product of
10 elements and the length of both public sets are N1 = N2 = 20. There is a
time-out of 30 minutes per test and in the case of the two memory algorithms,
algorithm 3 and algorithm 4, a memory M = 1000 is used. The same polycyclic
group G of Hirsch length 14 constructed from the polynomial x9 − 7x3 − 1 is
used for all algorithms.
Algorithm Time Success
Algorithm 1 (LBA with backtracking) 48.68 hours 0%
Algorithm 2 (LBA with dynamic set) 50.04 hours 0%
Algorithm 3 (Memory 1) 50.00 hours 0%
Algorithm 4 (Memory 2) 49.35 hours 3%
As we can see, algorithm 4 does best under this set of parameters, but even
then, it only has a 3% success rate. Contrast this to work done on the braid
group of similar parameters, which succeed in breaking AAG with high success
rate [39].
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To further test algorithm 4, we ran another set of tests where we increase
the length of random elements to [L1, L2] = [20, 23] and increase the number of
factors of the private key to L = 20. To give it a chance of success, we increase
the memory M to 40,000. The result is still 0% success rate, with a total run
time of 189.42 hours.
4.3.5 Effect of time-out increase
Since it is possible that the time-out of 30 minutes for each test is not enough, we
ran another set of tests where the time-out is 4 hours for each test. Algorithm 4
showed the most promise, so we chose it with the following parameters: the
length of random elements is in the interval [L1, L2] = [20, 23], the number of
factors of the private key is L = 20 and memory M is 1000. The polynomial used
is x9 − 7x3 − 1 with Hirsch length 14. Due to the long time-out, we performed
only 50 tests. The result is still 0% success rate, with a total run time of 200.37
hours.
4.3.6 Conclusion
Based on the above experimental results, we conclude that polycyclic groups of
high Hirsch lengths are resistant to the length-based attack. Thus, polycyclic
groups generated with number fields are suitable to be used as platform group for
the AAG key-exchange protocol in particular, and for other non-commutative
cryptographic primitives in general.
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4.3.7 Additional results with Algorithm 2
These are additional test results conducted with a time-out of 1 hour per test.
The polynomials used are f and h(G) is the Hirsch length of the generated poly-
cyclic group. The size of Alice’s and Bob’s public sets are N1, N2 respectively.
Every random element ai or bi has length in [L1, L2] and Alice’s private key is
the product of L = 5 random elements in Alice’s public set. The success rate
of a batch of 100 tests is recorded in percentage.
polynomial h(G) N1 = N2 = 5 N1 = N2 = 20
[5,8] [15,18] [10,13]
x− 1 1 98% 98%
x2 − x− 1 3 98% 96% 100%
x3 − x− 1 4 95% 100%
x5 − x3 − 1 7 35%
x7 − x3 − 1 10 8%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 5%
x11 − x3 − 1 16 59% 53% 5%
Chapter 5
Exploring Heisenberg Groups as
Platform for the AAG
Key-Exchange Protocol
In chapter 4, we explored polycyclic groups generated with number fields as
platform group for the AAG key-exchange protocol. Having success with that,
we now turn our attention to a different kind of polycyclic groups, Heisenberg
groups.
5.1 Heisenberg groups
Before talking about Heisenberg groups, we make a short detour through nilpo-
tent groups. We will see that nilpotent groups is a type of polycyclic group and
since Heisenberg groups are nilpotent, they are also polycyclic.
5.1.1 Nilpotent groups
Here, we give a short review of nilpotent groups based on [25, 43, 17].
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Let Z(G) be the center of the group G, i.e.,
Z(G) = {g ∈ G | gx = xg for all x ∈ G}.
Definition 5.1.1. The central series of a group G is a normal series
G = G1 G2  . . .Gn+1 = 1,
where Gi/Gi+1 ≤ Z(G/Gi+1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 5.1.2. A group G is nilpotent if it has such a series, and the nilpo-
tency class of G is the length of the shortest central series for G.
Another way to think about nilpotent groups is through the upper and lower
central series.
Definition 5.1.3. The upper central series of a group G is the ascending series
1 = Z0(G) Z1(G) . . . Zi(G) Zi+1(G) . . . ,
where Z0(G) = 1 and recursively, Zi+1(G)/Zi(G) = Z(G/Zi(G)) for i ≥ 1.
Definition 5.1.4. The lower central series of a group G is the descending series
G = γ1(G) γ2(G) . . . γi(G) γi+1(G) . . . ,
where γ1(G) = G and recursively, γi+1(G) = [G, γi(G)] for i ≥ 1.
It can be shown that the both the lower and upper central series are central
series if and only if they terminate [17]. Hence, a group G is nilpotent if and
only if either its lower or upper central series is finite. In this case, the upper and
lower central series both have the same length and this length is the nilpotency
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class of G. An easy example is a nilpotent group of class 1, it is an abelian
group.
It can also be shown that if G is a finitely generated nilpotent group then
each group in the lower central series of G is finitely generated [17]. Hence, each
quotient in the lower central series is a finitely generated abelian group, which
means G is polycyclic.
5.1.2 Heisenberg groups
Heisenberg groups have been studied widely from different points of views: anal-
ysis, geometry, physics, . . . [4]. From the group theory point of view, they are
often used as examples of nilpotent groups. For more discussion of Heisenberg
groups and their group-theoretic properties, see [10].
The three dimensional Heisenberg group, H, often known as the discrete
Heisenberg group, is the group of 3× 3 upper triangular matrices of the form
1 x y
0 1 z
0 0 1

where x, y, z ∈ R. If we let
A =

1 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
 , B =

1 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
 , C =

1 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 1

we can compute directly that [A,B] = C, [A,C] = [B,C] = I3. Hence, another
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presentation for the three dimensional Heisenberg group is
H = 〈a, b, c | [a, b] = c, [a, c] = [b, c] = 1〉.
We can also compute directly the center of H and its commutator subgroup.
Since they are equal, H is nilpotent of nilpotency class 2.
Generalizing the Heisenberg group, we have the higher dimension Heisenberg
groups, H2n+1, n ≥ 1, n ∈ Z. As matrix groups, they are groups of dimension
n+ 2 matrices of the form 
1 x1 . . . xn c
0 1 0 . . . yn
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 y1
0 0 . . . 0 1

where xi, yi, z ∈ R. The calculation for the commutator subgroup and the center
of H2n+1 is straight-forward, showing that it is also a nilpotent group, thus, also
polycyclic. The Hirsch length of H2n+1 is 2n+ 1.
The Heisenberg groups of higher dimension H2n+1 also has presentation
H2n+1 =〈a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn, c |
[ai, bi] = c, [ai, c] = [bi, c] = 1, [ai, aj] = [bi, bj] = 1, i 6= j〉
This presentation makes it easy to encode H2n+1 in a computer system. In
fact, the GAP (Groups, Algorithms, Programming) system [15] can compute
H2n+1 as part of the polycyclic package by Eick and Nickel [8]. Using this
implementation of H2n+1, we want to study the Heisenberg groups as platform
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group for the AAG key-exchange protocol, in particular, under the length-based
attack, one of the major attacks for AAG.
5.2 Results
As a test of the resilience of polycyclic groups against the length-based attack,
Garber, Kahrobaei, and Lam [11] implemented four variants of the length-based
attack and performed experiments against all four variants. The conclusion was
that Algorithm 4, LBA with Memory 2, was the most effective. Hence, in this
study, we use Algorithm 4 for all of our experiments.
We performed several sets of tests, all of which were run on an Intel Core I7
quad-core 2.0GHz computer with 12GB of RAM, running Ubuntu version 12.04
with GAP version 4.5 and 10GB of memory allowance. In all these tests, the
Heisenberg group G with 2n generators having Hirsch length h(G) = 2n + 1 is
generated using GAP with the Polycyclic group package [8]. The size of Alice’s
and Bob’s public sets are both N1 = N2 = 20, the memory used is M = 1000
and the time-out is 30 minutes. The implementation details of how a random
element is generated and how the private keys are generated are similar to that
of chapter 4, section 4.2.
To see the effect of element length, we fix a small key length, L = 10, but
changes the range of random element between [L1, L2] = [10, 13] and [20,23].
The result is as follows:
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n h(G) [L1, L2] = [10, 13] [L1, L2] = [20, 23]
5 11 29% 53%
6 13 69% 39%
7 15 51% 58%
8 17 62% 67%
As we can see, changing the length of random element does not have a
dramatic effect on the success rate. Hence, to ensure a lower rate of success,
one should look for other factors like the Hirsch length or the key length.
To see the effect of Hirsch length, we use a small key length L = 10 to
increase the possibility of success. The length of each random element is in the
range [L1, L2] = [10, 13]. The result is as follows:
n h(G) Time Success rate
3 7 45.42 hours 11%
5 11 37.82 hours 29%
6 13 21.12 hours 69%
7 15 28.95 hours 51%
8 17 24.33 hours 62%
Curiously, the higher the Hirsch length in this case, the higher and quicker
the length-based attack succeeded. This interesting result warrant further in-
vestigations.
To illustrate the effect of key length, in the following experiment, we let the
length of each random element to be in [L1, L2] = [20, 23] and vary the key
length L.
n h(G) L=10 L=20 L=50
5 11 53% 11% 1%
6 13 39% 7% 0%
7 15 58% 5% 1%
8 17 67% 9% 7%
Clearly, increasing the key length reduced the success rate dramatically.
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What is interesting is that the same algorithm, together with the same pa-
rameters, when applied on polycyclic group of Hirsch length 10 generated with
number field as in [11] gave 0% success rate. However, it is clear that we need
different parameters to ensure low success rates.
We turn the key length to L = 50, and let length of random element be
[L1, L2] = [40, 43]. Note that this is the parameters used in [39], which succeeded
in breaking AAG with braid groups.
n h(G) L=50
6 13 0%
7 15 0%
8 17 1%
As expected, this produces almost zero success rate. We recommend this as
parameters for Heisenberg group as platform for AAG.
Finally, as a stress test, we increase the time-out to 4 hours instead of the
usual 30 minutes per test. Because of the long time-out, we only do 50 tests
each, instead of 100 test batch as in the previous experiments. The element
length is kept at [L1, L2] = [20, 23], key length is L = 20.
n h(G) L=20
6 13 3%
7 15 4%
8 17 7%
Even at such long time-out, success rate is quite modest, given that the key
length we use here is quite small.
With these results, we conclude that the Heisenberg groups work well as
platform for the AAG protocol given the correct parameters. This strengthens
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the idea to use polycyclic group as platform for AAG in particular, and non-
commutative cryptographic primitives in general.
Chapter 6
The HKKS key-exchange
protocol
In this chapter, we talk about the HKKS key-exchange protocol, invented by
Habeeb, Kahrobaei, Koupparis, and Shpilrain in [16]. The protocol uses semidi-
rect product and extensions by automorphisms. Since it has close relation to
the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol, we are going to make a short visit to
the Diffie-Hellman protocol first.
6.1 The Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol
In chapter 1, we introduced the notion of public-key cryptography, a revolu-
tionary concept that makes possible a large part of the current e-commerce
system. What we did not mention was that the field of public-key cryptography
was started single-handedly from a paper by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hell-
man [6] (with contributions from Ralph Merkle), which detailed the first public
key-exchange protocol.
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In its original form, the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol uses the mul-
tiplicative group of integers modulus p, G = (Z/pZ)×, where p is a prime, and
g is primitive mod p, i.e., g is a generator of the cyclic group G. The following
steps outline the protocol:
Step 0 Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and g, a primitive root mod p. Both p
and g are public.
Step 1 Alice secretly chooses a random natural number a and sends ga to Bob.
Step 2 Bob secretly chooses a random natural number b and sends gb to Alice.
Step 3 Alice computes KA = (g
b)a = gba.
Step 4 Bob computes KB = (g
a)b = gab.
Since ab = ba because a, b ∈ N, we have KA = KB. Hence, Alice and Bob
now possess the same secret key.
The security of the protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman problem.
Definition 6.1.1. (Diffie-Hellman Problem) Given a finite cyclic group G, a
generating element g and ga, gb, recover gab where a, b ∈ N.
This is similar to the discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 6.1.2. (Discrete Logarithm Problem or DLP) Given a finite cyclic
group G, a generating element g and ga where a ∈ N, recover a.
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Clearly, an efficient algorithm that can solve DLP will be able to solve the
Diffie-Hellman problem: given ga, gb, a and b can be computed by the DLP-
solver, then the secret key gab can be easily computed. However, the two prob-
lems are not known to be equivalent. Currently, the Diffie-Hellman problem is
considered to be hard for a “good” choice of parameters [35].
A short note about computation efficiency of the protocol: it may seems
that to compute ga or gb, either party have to perform O(|g|) multiplications;
however, ga or gb can be computed in O(log a) multiplications using the “square-
and-multiply” method. See [35] for details of the method.
For more details on the Diffie-Hellman protocol as well as a collection of
known attacks, see the book by Menezes et. al. [35].
6.2 The HKKS Key-Exchange Protocol
In this section, we introduce the key-exchange protocol invented by Habeeb,
Kahrobaei, Koupparis, and Shpilrain based on semidirect product [16]. We will
then describes some platforms that have been suggested for this protocol. For
now, we make a small detour to talk about semidirect product.
6.2.1 Semidirect product and extensions by automor-
phisms
Definition 6.2.1. Let G,H be two groups, let Aut(G) be the group of auto-
morphisms of G, and let φ : H → Aut(G) be a homomorphism. The semidirect
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product of G and H is the set
Γ = Goφ H = {(g, h) | g ∈ G, h ∈ H},
with the group operation given by
(g, h) · (g′, h′) = (φ(h)(g) · g′, h · h′).
In the case that H = Aut(G) then the group Γ is called the holomorph,
Hol(G), of the group G.
Definition 6.2.2. Let G be a group, the holomorph of G is the set
Hol(G) = GoId Aut(G) = {(g, φ) | g ∈ G, φ ∈ Aut(G)},
with the group operation given by
(g, φ) · (g′, φ′) = (φ′(g) · g′, φ · φ′).
Note that when we write φ · φ′ we mean φ is applied first.
A special case of the semidirect product construction is extension by au-
tomorphisms where we do not use the whole group Aut(G) but only a cyclic
subgroup of it, which is generated by a fixed φ ∈ Aut(G). The resulting object
Γ is also a group. Since every automorphism that we are concerned with now
is an element of 〈φ〉, the group operation becomes
(g, φr)(h, φs) = (φs(g) · h, φr+s).
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In particular, to calculate exponents of an element of Γ, we have:
(g, φ)m = (g, φ) · (g, φ) · (g, φ)m−2
= (φ(g) · g, φ2) · (g, φ) · (g, φ)m−3
= (φ2(g) · φ(g) · g, φ3) · (g, φ) · (g, φ)m−4
= . . .
= (φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φm)
This construction works just as well with a semigroup G and and endomor-
phism φ instead of a group and an automorphism. In that case, the resulting
object Γ is a semigroup instead.
6.2.2 The HKKS key-exchange protocol
The HKKS key-exchange protocol is based on extension of a (semi)group by
automorphisms [16]. It has some resemblance to the classical Diffie-Hellman
protocol, but there are distinctive features that give it advantages. The following
steps describes the protocol:
Step 0 Alice and Bob agree on a (semi)group G, an element g ∈ G and an
automorphism φ ∈ Aut(G) (or an endomorphism φ ∈ End(G)). All
G, g and φ are public. Alice chooses a private m ∈ N and Bob chooses a
private n ∈ N.
Step 1 Alice computes (g, φ)m = (φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φm) and sends
only the first component of this pair to Bob. Thus, she sends to Bob
only the element a = φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g.
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Step 2 Bob computes (g, φ)n = (φn−1(g) ·φn−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φn) and sends only
the first component of this pair to Alice. Thus, he sends to Alice only
the element b = φn−1(g) · φn−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g.
Step 3 Alice computes (b, x) · (a, φm) = (φm(b) · a, x · φm). Her key is now
KA = φ
m(b) ·a. Note that she does not actually “compute” x ·φm because
she does not know the automorphism x = φn; recall that it was not
transmitted to her. But she does not need it to compute KA.
Step 4 Bob computes (a, y) · (b, φn) = (φn(a) · b, y · φn). His key is now KB =
φn(a) · b. Again, Bob does not actually “compute” y · φn because he does
not know the automorphism y = φm.
Note that
KA = φ
m(b) · a
= φm
(
φn−1(g) · φn−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g) · φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g
= φm+n−1(g) · φm+n−2(g) · · ·φm+1(g) · φm(g) · φm−1(g) · · ·φ(g) · g
which is the first coordinate of (g, φ)m+n and also equal to φn(a) · b = KB.
Hence, KA = KB = K, the shared secret key.
Note that, in contrast with the “standard” Diffie-Hellman key-exchange,
correctness here is based on the equality hm · hn = hn · hm = hm+n rather
than on the equality (hm)n = (hn)m = hmn. In the “standard” Diffie-Hellman
set up, this trick would not work because, if the shared key K was just the
product of two openly transmitted elements ga, gb, then anybody, including the
eavesdropper, could compute K.
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For the computational cost of the protocol, it may seem at first that both
parties have to compute a product of m (or n) elements of the (semi)group G.
However, (g, φ)m (or (g, φ)n) can be computed using the “square-and-multiply”
method as in the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol. The exact cost, of course,
depends on the platform being used.
6.3 Platforms for the HKKS key-exchange pro-
tocol
6.3.1 Multiplicative group of integers modulus p
The simplest instantiation of the protocol uses the multiplicative group of inte-
gers modulus p where p is a prime [16]. The public endomorphism φ is selected
by choosing k > 1 so that for h ∈ (Z/pZ)×, we have φ(h) = hk. If k is relatively
prime to p− 1 then φ is actually an automorphism. Alice and Bob choose their
private m,n according to the guideline for the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Note that if g ∈ (Z/pZ)×, then exponentiation of an element in the semidi-
rect product is:
(g, φ)m = (φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φm)
= (gk
m−1 · gkm−2 · · · gk · g, φm)
= (gk
m−1+...+k+1, φm) = (g
km−1
k−1 , φm)
Hence, Alice sends to Bob g
km−1
k−1 and Bob sends to Alice g
kn−1
k−1 . The shared
secret key is then the first component of (g, φ)m+n which is g
km+n−1
k−1 .
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Eve can choose a “direct” attack of the protocol by trying to recover Alice’s
and Bob’s private key m,n. To guess either of them, Eve will have to first
recover k
m−1
k−1 from g
km−1
k−1 and then recover m from k
m−1
k−1 , solving the discrete log
problem twice.
Eve can also look at this as an analog of the Diffie-Hellman problem: recover
the shared key K = g
km+n−1
k−1 from the triple (g, g
km−1
k−1 , g
kn−1
k−1 ). Since g, k are
public, this is equivalent to recovering gk
m+n
from the triple (g, gk
m
, gk
n
), which
is exactly the standard Diffie-Hellman problem.
Since this instantiation of the protocol is the equivalent of the classic Diffie-
Hellman protocol, breaking the HKKS protocol for any cyclic group would imply
breaking the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
6.3.2 Matrices over group rings
In [16], another platform of the HKKS protocol is also introduced, this time
using a semigroup and inner automorphism instead.
A (semi)group ring R[G] of a (semi)group G over a commutative ring R is
the set of all formal sums ∑
gi∈G
rigi,
where ri ∈ R, and almost all ri are zero.
The sum of two elements in R[G] is defined by(∑
gi∈G
aigi
)
+
(∑
gi∈G
bigi
)
=
∑
gi∈G
(ai + bi)gi.
The product of two elements in R[G] is defined using distributivity.
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The platform suggested by Habeeb, Kahrobaei, Koupparis and Shpilrain
uses the semigroup G of 3× 3 matrices over the group ring Z7[A5] where A5 is
the alternating group on 5 elements. The semigroup G is extended by an inner
automorphism φH , which is conjugation by a matrix H ∈ GL3(Z7[A5]), i.e.,
φH(M) = H
−1MH. Both M ∈ G and H are public knowledge. Conveniently,
for any matrix M ∈ G, and any integer k ≥ 1, we have φkH(M) = H−kMHk.
As usual, we look at exponentiation of an element of the semidirect product:
(M,φH)
m = (φm−1H (M) · φm−2H (M) · · ·φH(M) ·M,φmH)
= (H−m+1MHm−1 · · ·H−2MH2 ·H−1MH,φmH)
= H−m(HM)m
Hence, Alice sends to Bob the matrix H−m(HM)m and Bob sends to Alice
the matrix H−n(HM)n, and the shared secret key is H−(m+n)(HM)(m+n).
The eavesdropper can try to recover the private exponentm fromH−m(HM)m.
This problem appears to be hard, in the special case that H = Id, we have the
analog of the DLP for matrices over Z7[A5]: recover m given M and Mm. This
problem was addressed in [30], which shows using statistical experiments that
for a random matrix M , matrices Mm are indistinguishable from random.
Chapter 7
Matrices over Galois Field:
A New Platform for HKKS
As we have already seen in chapter 6, the HKKS key-echange protocol can be
used with any non-commutative group G if φ is selected to be a non-trivial inner
automorphism, i.e., conjugation by an element which is not in the center of G.
Furthermore, it can be used with any non-commutative semigroup G as well,
as long as G has some invertible elements; these can be used to produce inner
automorphisms. In this section, we introduce a new platform for the HKKS
key-exchange protocol, that of matrices over a Galois field.
7.1 Galois Field
First, a short introduction to Galois field, otherwise known as finite field. In
our application, we are only concerned with binary fields, GF(2m), that is, finite
fields of order 2m. Binary fields are widely used in cryptography and there are
several well-studied algorithms in binary field arithmetic, making computation
with them very fast.
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One way to represent GF(2m) is to use binary polynomials, whose coeffi-
cients are in the field GF(2) = {0, 1}. Then the elements of GF(2m) are binary
polynomials of degree at most m− 1:
GF(2m) = {am−1zm−1 + am−2zm−2 + . . .+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 | ai ∈ {0, 1}}.
For each GF(2m), there is an irreducible binary polynomial f(z) of degree m
such that GF(2m) ∼= Z2[x]/(f(x)). Multiplication of field elements of GF(2m)
is performed modulo f(z). Addition of field elements is the usual polynomial
addition in Z2[x].
To represent field element, we associate a field element a(z) = an−1zn−1 +
an−2zn−2 + . . .+ a2z2 + a1z + a0 with the binary number a = (an−1 . . . a2a1a0).
Addition and subtraction in the field is then simply bitwise XOR (exclusive-or).
Multiplication, without reduction, can be done using a number of algorithms,
mostly taking advantage of vector shifts, and thus can be realized in polynomial
time (see [18]).
Polynomial squaring of a field element a(z) can be achieved by inserting a
0 bit between consecutive bits of the binary representation of a(z), hence it is
a linear operation. Reduction of a binary polynomials are relatively fast, but
particularly fast if certain irreducible polynomials are used for certain binary
field. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recom-
mendations for such polynomials [40].
For more details of the various algorithms for binary field arithmetic, see
the book by Menezes et. al. [35] and the book by Hankerson et. al. [18]. The
software package RELIC implements, among other things, binary fields and
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several algorithms for binary field arithmetic [3].
7.2 HKKS with Matrices over a Galois Field
As a new platform for the HKKS key-exchange protocol, we suggest G to be
the semigroup of 2 × 2 matrices over the Galois field GF(2t). Here we use an
extension of the semigroup G by an endomorphism ϕ, which is a composition
of a conjugation by a matrix H ∈ GL2(GF(2t)) with the endomorphism ψ that
raises each entry of a given matrix to the power of 4. The composition is such
that ψ is applied first, followed by conjugation, i.e., with public element M and
H, we have ϕ(M) = H−1ψ(M)H. Thus, for any matrix M ∈ G and for any
integer k ≥ 1, we have:
ϕk(M) = ϕk−1(H−1ψ(M)H)
= ϕk−2
(
ϕ(H−1ψ(M)H)
)
= ϕk−2
(
H−1ψ(H−1)ψ2(M) · · ·ψ(H)H)
. . .
= H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψk−1(H−1)ψk(M)ψk−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H
The HKKS protocol is specialized to this platform as follows:
Step 0 Alice and Bob agree on a degree k for the Galois field and public matrices
M ∈ G and H ∈ GL2(GF(2t)). Alice selects a private positive integer m,
and Bob selects a private positive integer n.
Step 1 Alice computes (M,ϕ)m and sends only the first component of this
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pair to Bob. Thus, she sends to Bob only the matrix
A = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψm−1(H−1)ψm(M)ψm−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H.
Step 2 Bob computes (M,ϕ
H
)n and sends only the first component of this
pair to Alice. Thus, he sends to Alice only the matrix
B = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψn−1(H−1)ψn(M)ψn−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H.
Step 3 Alice computes (B, x) · (A, ϕm) = (ϕm(B) · A, x · ϕm). Her key is now
KA = ϕ
m(B) · A, which is the first component of (M,ϕ)m+n. Note that
she does not actually “compute” x · ϕm because she does not know the
automorphism x = ϕn; recall that it was not transmitted to her. But she
does not need it to compute KA.
Step 4 Bob computes (A, y) · (B, ϕn) = (ϕn(A) · B, y · ϕn). His key is now
KB = ϕ
n(A) ·B. Again, Bob does not actually “compute” y · ϕn because
he does not know the automorphism y = ϕm.
Since (B, x) · (A, ϕm) = (A, y) · (B, ϕn) = (M, ϕ)m+n, we have KA =
KB = K, the shared secret key.
63
7.3 Security Analysis
7.3.1 Security assumption
Since the shared secret key K is the first component of (M, ϕ)m+n, it is a
product
K = ϕm+n−1(M) · · ·ϕ(M)M , where
ϕi(M) = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψi−1(H−1)ψi(M)ψi−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H
The security assumption of the protocol is that it is hard to recover K
from the matrices H,M,A, and B, where A and B are the first components of
(M, ϕ)m and (M, ϕ)n, respectively.
To analyze the security assumption of the protocol, we first drop ψ and only
consider ϕ = H−1MH, we note that now ϕk = H−kMHk. A further simplifica-
tion, letting H = Id yields the analog of the discrete log problem for matrices
over GF(2t): recover m given M and Mm. Standard attacks of the discrete
log problem like “Pollard’s rho” or “baby-step giant-step” are based on the dif-
ficulty of detecting cycles. In our system, looking for a “cycle” would mean
looking for i, j such that x−iyi = x−jyj, where x = H, y = HM . Assuming
that both x and y are invertible, the last equality is equivalent to xk = yk, where
k = i− j. Thus, the problem becomes not detecting a cycle, but rather to find
an intersection of two independent cycles. This is a more general problem than
cycle detection and apparently more difficult.
Another attack that Eve can employ is by looking at the determinants of the
public matrices H,M,A, and B. She can reduce the problem of recovering the
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private exponent m to the discrete log problem for the pair (detM, (detM)n).
To foil this kind of attack, it makes sense to select a matrix M with the deter-
minant equal to 0 or 1.
7.3.2 Questions about randomness
To verify the robustness and security of our platform, we have experimentally
addressed two questions. The first question is whether or not any information
about the private exponent n is leaked from transmission. That is, for a random
exponent n, how different is the first component of (M, ϕ)n from N , where N
is a random matrix?
To address this question, we chose the semigroup G to be 2 × 2 matrices
over the Galois field GF(2127), hence each entry of a matrix is a bit string of
length 127. We generated random matrices P,N ∈ G, repeated this process 500
times and generated a frequency distribution table for the two distributions. We
then plotted the resulting Q−Q plots of the frequency distributions generated
by the corresponding entries of the first component of (P, ϕ)n. The result is
indistinguishable from a random matrix.
The second question is to determine how different the final shared key is from
a random matrix. More specifically, if Alice and Bob choose secret integers m
and n respectively, how different is the first component of (P, ϕ)n+m from (P, ϕ)c,
where c is of the same bit size as n+m?
We used a similar experiment to determine this question, namely, we gen-
erated a random matrix P , and random m,n and c such that m + n ≈ c. We
repeated this process 500 times and generated a frequency distribution table for
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the two distributions. From the table, we produced Q − Q (quantile) plots of
the entries of the two matrices: the corresponding entries of the first compo-
nent of (P, ϕ)m+n and (P, ϕ)c. The experiment result confirmed that there is
no difference between them.
7.4 Implementation and Results
7.4.1 Parameters and key generation
The private exponents m and n of the HKKS protocol should be of the magni-
tude 2t, where t is the security parameter, to make brute force search infeasible.
Thus, m and n are roughly t bits long.
In our implementation of the protocol, we chose t = 127 and t = 571, aiming
for 127-bit and 571-bit security. That means we are working with Galois field
GF(2127) and GF(2571), hence the private keys m,n have size 127 bits and 571
bits respectively.
Our realization of the Galois field GF(2127) is the factor algebra Z2[x]/〈p(x)〉,
where 〈p(x)〉 is the ideal of the polynomial algebra Z2[x] generated by the irre-
ducible polynomial p(x) = x127 + x63 + 1. Elements of GF(2127) are therefore
polynomials of degree at most 126 over Z2.
Similarly, our realization of the Galois field GF(2571) is the factor algebra
Z2[x]/〈q(x)〉, where 〈q(x)〉 is the ideal of Z2[x] generated by the irreducible
polynomial q(x) = x571 + x10 + x5 + x2 + 1. Elements of GF(2571) are therefore
polynomials of degree at most 570 over Z2. Both the polynomials p(x) and
q(x) are chosen because there are algorithms concerning trinomials and quintic
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polynomials that make binary field arithmetics in them faster. See the RELIC
package [3] for more details.
The public matrix M is selected as a random 2 × 2 matrix over the Galois
field GF(2127) (respectively, GF(2571)), which means that each entry of M is
a random bit string of length 127 (respectively, length 571) corresponding to
coefficients of a polynomial of degree at most 126 (resp. 570) over Z2. For
security reasons M should be either non-invertible or have determinant 0 or
1. To select such a 2 × 2 matrix, we first select 3 entries randomly, and then
select the remaining entry so that the determinant is what we want. This is an
efficient procedure.
In the case of t = 271, the bit complexity of the matrix M is 127 · 4 = 508
bits, the whole public key consists of the matrix M and an invertible matrix H,
so the total size of the public key is 1016 bits. In the case of t = 271, the bit
complexity of a 2× 2 matrix over GF(2571) is 2284 bits, so the total size of the
public key is 4568 bits.
Then, we need to sample an invertible 2×2 matrix H over a Galois field. To
do that, we sample a random 2 × 2 matrix as above, compute its determinant
and check that it is not equal to 0 in the Galois field. If it is equal to 0 (this can
happen with small probability), then we start over. Also, having computed the
determinant of H, we then easily compute H−1. Finally, we have to check that
H does not commute with M , i.e., HM 6= MH. If it does, we select a different
H.
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7.4.2 How to make sure the base element has a large
order
We note that there is always a concern (also in the standard Diffie-Hellman
protocol) about the order of a public element: if the order is too small, then a
brute force attack may be feasible. In our situation, this concern is significantly
alleviated by the fact that our transmissions are products of powers of different
matrices, ϕk(M) for k = 1, . . . ,m − 1, rather than powers of a single matrix.
Therefore, even if the order of one of the matrices happens to be small by
accident, this does not mean that the whole product will go into loop of a small
size.
However, if one wants a guarantee that the base element (M, ϕ) has a large
order, this requires some extra effort. First we observe that the order of an
element (g, ϕ) of a semidirect product tends to have the magnitude of the g.c.d.
of the orders of the individual elements g and ϕ in their “native” (semi)groups.
Particularly, we can try to bound the order of the base element in our sug-
gested platform of matrices over Galois field. Suppose the base element (M, ϕ)
has order k, the second component of (M, ϕ)k is varphik. This endomorphism
acts on an arbitrary 2× 2 matrix S over a Galois field by:
ϕk(S) = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψk−1(H−1)ψk(S)ψk−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H.
To bound the order k from below, we can look at the determinant of ϕk(S).
Since the determinant map is multiplicative, this is equal to det(ψk(S)). Since
we are working in characteristic 2, we have det(ψk(S)) = det(ψ(S)k) = (det(ψ(S)))k
(recall that the endomorphism ψ acts by raising each entry of S to the power
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of 4). Now notice that if S is invertible, then det(S) is an element of the
multiplicative group of the relevant Galois field.
If, for example, the Galois field is GF(2127), then the order of this group is
2127 − 1, which happens to be a prime number. Therefore, if det(S) 6= 1, then
det(S), as well as det(ψ(S)), has order 2127 − 1 in the multiplicative group of
GF(2127). This gives a lower bound for the order of the second component of
a base element (M,φ). The actual order should be much higher for “generic”
matrices S and H, but if one wants a guaranteed lower bound, then 2127 − 1
should be satisfactory.
7.4.3 Computational cost and run time
Recall the transmitted elements are
A = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψm−1(H−1)ψm(M)ψm−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H, and
B = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψn−1(H−1)ψn(M)ψn−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H
It may seem that the parties have to compute a product ofm (respectively, n)
elements of G, the semigroup of 2×2 matrices over a Galois field. However, since
the parties obtain A (or B) as the first component of (M,ϕ)m (resp. (M,ϕ)n),
they actually compute powers of an element of the semigroup Γ, which is an
extension of G by an endomorphism. Hence, they can use the “square-and-
multiply” method, as in the standard Diffie-Hellman protocol.
To apply ϕ to an element of G, first there’s the cost of conjugating by a
matrix H, which amounts to just two multiplications of matrices in G (which
boils down to 8 multiplications in GF(2127) or GF(2571)). Second is the cost
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of applying the endomorphism ψ which in fact, does not require any multipli-
cations, but just inserting “0” bits in a bit string representing an element the
Galois field, see [3].
To compute powers of ϕ applied to an element of G, recall
ϕk(M) = H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψk−1(H−1)ψk(M)ψk−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H.
This can be broken into products of three components: H−1ψ(H−1) · · ·ψk−1(H−1),
ψk(M) and ψk−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H. The first and third components are inverses of
each other so we can compute the third component and take its inverse, which
amounts to calculating determinant of a matrix and finding its inverses in the
Galois field, all of which can be done efficiently.
To calculate ψk−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H, in the case of GF(2127), we pre-compute
powers ψ2
i
(H) for i = 0, . . . , 128, each of which is a matrix of 127 ·4 = 508 bits,
for a total of 65532 bits (about 8 Kilobyte) to be put in storage. Then we again
use “square-and-multiply” to find the long product. Similarly, in the case of
GF(2571), we also pre-compute powers ψ2i(H) for i = 0, . . . , 572, each of which
is a matrix of 571 · 4 = 2284 bits. Hence, we need to save 1308732 bits, about
160 Kilobyte. As we can see, the storage needed is minuscule.
To calculate ψk(M), we raise each entry of the matrix M to the power 4k
mod 2127 − 1 (entries of M are elements of GF(2127)). This relies on RELIC’s
Montgomery powering ladder method.
We used the RELIC package [3] for big integers and binary field arithmetic
in GF(2127) and GF(2571). The computations are done on a desktop computer
with the following specifications: Intel Core 2 Duo CPU at 3.00GHz x 2, 8 GiB
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RAM, running Ubuntu 12.04.
With the parameters specified in section 7.4.1, we ran two types of experi-
ments, one where the endomorphism ϕ is ϕ = H−1ψ(M)H and the other where
ϕ = H−1MH (i.e. dropping the extra endomorphism ψ which raises each entry
of a matrix to the power of 4.) We measure the total time taken vs. time for
private key generation and shared key computation, noting that in practice,
once the key-exchange program is set up, it can be re-used to generate many
different keys by randomizing m,n.
with psi without psi
total time
key generation
& computation
total time
key generation
& computation
GF(2127) 0.323s 0.149s 0.153s 0.035s
GF(2571) 6.907s 1.247s
7.4.4 Conclusion
We have presented a new platform for the HKKS key-exchange protocol based
on extension by endomorphisms of a semigroup of matrices over GF(2127) and
GF(2571). It has some resemblance to the classical Diffie-Hellman protocol,
but there are several distinctive features that, we believe, give our protocol
important advantages:
• Even though the parties do compute a large power of a public element (as
in the classical Diffie-Hellman protocol), they do not transmit the whole
result, but rather just part of it.
• By varying automorphisms (or endomorphisms) used for extension, we get
new security assumptions. We illustrate this point by using a particular
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endomorphism which is a composition of an inner automorphism (i.e.,
conjugation by an invertible matrix) with the endomorphism that raises
each entry of a given matrix to the power of 4.
• New security assumptions alluded to in the previous bullet point allow us
to dodge standard attacks based on cycle detection methods.
• By working in a Galois field of characteristic 2, we make computation very
efficient.
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